Sustainability of fisheries and fishery-dependent communities depends largely on the intrinsic characteristics of social, economic, and legal systems that determine who is allowed to fish and how fishing takes place. That is, fisheries sustainability is not a biological problem, it is a social problem. Social factors that contribute to or detract from sustainability are illustrated in four Alaskan fisheries as they have evolved over time. Each fishery has come to be managed under durable entitlements (DEs) in terms of their participation. DE programmes, such as limited entry permits and individual or community fishing quotas, can increase profitability and help fishers adapt to modest adverse changes in stock abundance, ex-vessel prices, or input costs, but the design characteristics of some DE programmes makes them vulnerable to larger perturbations. Moreover, although DE programmes increase choice and therefore resilience from the perspective of individuals, they can increase or decrease the resilience of fishery-dependent communities.
Introduction
Charles (2001) characterizes sustainable fisheries systems in terms of ecological, socio-economic, community, and institutional dimensions. He suggests that sustainability requires more than maintenance of robust fish stocks; it also requires conditions that promote social and economic well-being, viable resourcedependent communities, and an institutional structure that allows for evolution of socio-ecological systems. Rather than attempting to identify necessary and sufficient conditions for sustaining fisheries-dependent socio-ecological systems, it may be instructive to consider what it takes to disrupt them. The surest way to crash a fisheries-dependent socio-ecological system is to fail to solve the common-pool resource dilemma through failure to understand the limits of the biophysical system, the failure to stay within those limits, or the failure to prevent emergence of a race to possess the resource (Dietz et al., 2003) . It is particularly easy to crash socio-ecological systems by failing to recognize or adapt to non-stationarities. As used here, non-stationarities are changes to time-dependent process such that past behaviour of the time-series does not convey useful information about future behaviour to the time-series (Priestley, 1988) . For example, in a bioeconomic model of sustainable fishing, environmental or ecological change, population or demographic change, technological change, changes in social preferences, or changes in input or output prices may fundamentally alter how the fishery-dependent socio-ecological system behaves (Schmitz and Seckler, 1970; Beamish et al., 1999; Hamilton, 2007; Mueter et al., 2011) . Socio-ecological systems can also fail when subjected to shocks-one-time perturbations-that exceed critical biophysical, social, or economic thresholds. Critical shocks could include catastrophic environmental events such as a volcanic eruption or tsunami, or socio-economic events such as macroeconomic failures, fishery closures, or zoonoses and epidemics that disrupt socio-ecological systems to such an extent that the systems are unable to re-establish a pre-event state even long after the event has ended.
Alaska region fisheries are often held up as examples of fisheries done right (Worm et al., 2011) . However, although this may be correct from a simple single-species biological perspective, the performance of Alaska region fisheries as sustainable socio-ecological systems is more nuanced. The performance and resilience of four Alaska region fisheries are discussed in the sections that follow.
Each is currently governed under a system of durable entitlements (DEs), which are solutions to the common-pool resource dilemma that entail provisions to stint access to or withdrawals from the common-pool through grants of durable exclusive privileges to individuals or groups. Examples of DE include limited entry permits (LEPs; Christy and Scott, 1965; Wilen, 1988) , territorial use rights in fisheries (Christy, 1982; Seijo, 1993) , transferable trap certificates (SAFMC/GFMC, 1992) , days-at-sea allocations (NEFMC, 2003) , individual vessel quotas (IVQs; Casey et al., 1995) , individual fishing quotas (IFQs; Moloney and Pearse, 1979; NRC, 1999) , community quotas (CQs; NRC, 1998), enterprise allocations (Stevens et al., 2008) , sector allocations (Sylvia et al., 2008; Wilen and Richardson, 2008) , and community fisheries (Ruddle, 1989) . The history of the four Alaska region fisheries provides examples of successful and unsuccessful solutions to biological and social dimensions of the common-pool resource dilemma, successful and unsuccessful adaptation to or accommodation of non-stationary changes in environmental, economic, and social systems, and examples of successful and unsuccessful response to shocks.
Alaska's salmon fisheries
Alaska is home to seven species of Pacific salmon: Chinook salmon Oncoryhnchus tshawytscha, coho salmon Oncoryhnchus kisutch, sockeye salmon Oncoryhnchus nerka, chum salmon Oncoryhnchus keta, pink salmon Oncoryhnchus gorbuscha, steelhead trout Oncoryhnchus mykiss, and cutthroat trout Oncoryhnchus clarkii (Mecklenburg et al., 2002) . These species have been the focus of intensive fisheries from pre-modern times (Newell, 1994; Clark et al., 2006) . Wherever Pacific salmon were abundant, subsistence harvesters exploited them. Practical limits to preservation and storage of salmon, combined with the harsh consequences of exceeding sustainable yields, ensured that harvests by subsistence users did not routinely exceed the productivity of local stocks (Rogers, 1979) . Development of commercial fisheries in the late 1800s disrupted this long-standing resolution of the common-pool resource dilemma in many ways. First, commercial harvests reduced the amount of fish available to subsistence harvesters and thereby reduced the food security of subsistence communities and the food surpluses used for trade with neighbouring peoples to obtain goods not available in coastal areas (Newell, 1994) . In addition, the commercial fishery changed the nature of risk associated with overharvest of the salmon resource. To subsistence users, overharvest of salmon created a risk of starvation. In contrast, the risk to commercial fishers was one of financial loss; if one river was fished out, they could move on to the next. A longstanding solution to the common-pool resource dilemma was disrupted by the arrival of new resource claimants (Cordell, 1978; Higgs, 1982) .
The disruption of customary and traditional control of regional fisheries led to unsustainable harvests and financial distress. In the absence of effective social or legal controls on harvests, private firms (fish packers) who controlled strategic properties near the mouths of major salmon-producing rivers began to exercise financial and extra-legal controls on harvests (Cooley, 1963) . The forces of economic selection led to expansion of those packers that adopted sustainable exploitation strategies and ensured the demise of those that did not. However, in addition to ignoring the rights and needs of subsistence harvesters, the packers took advantage of their exclusive role as monopsonists (sole buyers) to exploit the fishers who delivered to them (Cooley, 1963) . The packer's solution to the common-pool resource dilemma addressed biological sustainability because sustaining salmon stocks aligned with their self-interest. However, in setting out to maximize their own profits, packers adopted cost-effective harvest technologies such as traps and weirs, which reduced their need for fishers. The ensuing loss of fishing jobs combined with objections to the serf-like labour conditions was not acceptable to a broad swathe of society. This dissatisfaction over the exercise of market power by the packers, and the failure of the federal government to rein in that power, served as impetus for Alaskans to seek statehood. Salmon traps were banned shortly after statehood was attained in 1959 (Rogers, 1979) . The ban on fish traps reignited the race for fish. As more and bigger boats entered the fishery, it became increasingly difficult for fishery managers to control catches, and biological sustainability was imperilled.
Following statehood, Alaska set about rebuilding depleted salmon stocks (Cooley, 1963; Clark et al., 2006) . However, because they are highly migratory, salmon range far beyond state waters (0 -3 nautical miles; miles hereafter) and well beyond US territorial seas (0 -12 miles) that then represented the extent of Federal and state authority to control fishing. Japanese vessels fishing in international waters off Bristol Bay, Alaska, took substantial harvests of salmon from the 1930s through the commencement of World War II. Foreign fishing pressure resumed in the mid-1950s and expended from Bristol Bay to areas off southcentral and southeast Alaska during the 1960s and early 1970s (Pennoyer et al., 1979) . Although bilateral negotiations with Japan, Korea, and Russia helped limit the volume of foreign harvests, those harvests reduced the efficacy of state efforts to recover stocks (Clark et al., 2006) . US assertion of an exclusive economic zone (EEZ; 0 -200 miles) in 1976 was immediately followed by a ban of foreign fishing for salmon within the EEZ off Alaska. Other nations bordering the North Pacific also declared EEZs of similar extent. In 1992, the North Pacific Anadromous Fisheries Commission, acting at the behest of the United States, Canada, Russia, and Japan, declared a ban on salmon fishing on the high seas, i.e. beyond the 200-miles EEZs.
To stem the influx of fishing capacity into state-managed salmon fisheries, Alaska passed the Limited Entry Act of 1973; by 1974, Limited Entry was implemented in most Alaskan salmon fisheries. Under Limited Entry, a maximum was set for the number of vessels permitted to use specific types of gear in each fishing area. In all, 12 655 LEPs for salmon were issued, each for a specific region and gear type (CFEC, 2005) . Past participation was used to determine who would and who would not be granted LEPs. Koslow (1982) suggests that the criteria for issuing LEPs disenfranchised small-scale fishers in Bristol Bay.
[Eligibility was determined on a points system that favoured recent participation as evidenced by ownership of a commercial licence to participate in the fishery. Licence-holders were awarded three points per year for 1971 and 1972, two points per year for 1969 and 1970, and one point per year for [1965] [1966] [1967] [1968] . Points were also awarded for dependence on the fishery for at least two-thirds of their income in 1971 and 1972, and for fishing for at least 3 weeks in each of the 1971 and 1972 seasons (Koslow, 1982) . The criteria were intended to exclude part-time fishers (Adasiak, 1979) . Koslow (1982) notes that many local fishers had less experience in the fishery, fished on smaller vessels that yielded less income, and did not fish or fished for only a few days in 1971 and 1972 because the salmon runs were weak. Moreover, many local fishers did not hold permits because only
The resilience of four Alaskan fisheries governed by durable entitlements one permit was required per vessel and 33% of local fishers fished in full partnerships (Koslow, 1982).] LEPs are DEs that can, with few limitations, be transferred from one individual to another at mutually agreeable terms of exchange. Although the LEP programme stemmed the influx of boats, it failed to prevent continued escalation of fishing power and associated pathologies of the race-for-fish (Wilen, 1988) . For example, in Bristol Bay, the average annual catch of 25.2 × 10 6 sockeye salmon is allocated to 1863 drift-gillnet and 981 set-gillnet LEP holders under a winner-takes-all derby. The perverse incentives of the race-for-fish led fishers to purchase evermore powerful and costly fishing vessels to catch an unchanged quantity of fish. First adopters of technologies that increased the quantity of fish caught per day gained ephemeral advantage over their peers until the latter too adopted the technology or were bought-out by others who would. Nevertheless, buoyed by strong prices caused by declines in salmon production outside Alaska, Alaskan salmon fishery ex-vessel revenues and the price of LEPs soared through the mid-1980s (Figure 1) . In other words, the socially and economically unsustainable structure of the Alaskan salmon fisheries was masked by a non-stationarity-increasing ex-vessel prices caused by stable demand and decreases in the harvests of high-valued salmon (Chinook, coho, sockeye, and steelhead) in the US Pacific Northwest and British Columbia.
Limits to the resilience of the Alaska salmon socio-ecological system became evident by the early 1990s when first Norway, then Canada, the UK, and Chile, began to supply world markets with large volumes of farmed Atlantic salmon (Salmo salar) and farmed coho and steelhead (Figure 2 ). Competition from aquaculture supplies depressed Alaskan ex-vessel prices and revenues (Herrmann et al., 1993; Herrmann, 1994; Williams et al., 2009 ; Figure 1 ). Aquaculture production increased because technological innovation in aquaculture caused production costs to decline more rapidly than the production-induced decreases in product prices (Olson and Criddle, 2008) . Feed costs alone have declined by an average of 1.4% per year, despite rapidly rising prices for fishmeal (Steiner et al., 2011) . To those unfamiliar with the spendthrift incentives of the race-for-fish, it begs comprehension to learn that Alaska's salmon LEP fisheries fail to generate profits comparable with those generated in salmon aquaculture, where feed and smolt costs alone are .US$ 1.50 kg -1 round weight (Steiner et al., 2011) . The collapse of ex-vessel prices created social and economic turmoil in salmon fishing communities because it reduced annual revenues from a peak of .US$ 1.3 × 10 9 to ,US$ 0.2 × 10 9 , and at the same time deflated the asset value of LEPs to well below the amounts borrowed against their previously high prices. Bursting of the LEP asset price-bubble financially ruined thousands of salmon fishers; 43% of the salmon LEP holders did not participate in their fishery in 2002. These effects were particularly pronounced in rural (defined as regions with a population of ,2500 and not located in proximity to a community with a population of .2500) Alaska, where local residents went from controlling .38% of all salmon LEPs in the mid-1970s to only controlling 24% in 2010 (Gho et al., 2011) . The change in the distribution of salmon LEP ownership is complex, but there are several salient patterns: 22% of the LEPs issued to rural Alaskans are now held by urbanites in Alaska and elsewhere in the United States; most (61.5%) out-of-region transfers resulted from migration by LEP-holders; and most (82%) interim LEPs that have been cancelled were issued to individuals who resided in urban and rural areas next to the fishery (Gho et al., 2011) .
Although Alaska's salmon management may be characterized as sustainable from a narrow biological perspective, it is hard to describe the fishery as anything but an abject economic failure. The race-for-fish resulted in individually sensible but collectively irrational excess investment in harvesting capacity, which in turn induced excess investment in processing capacity (Matulich and Sever, 1999) . The overcapitalized Alaskan salmon fishery is illpositioned to compete effectively against substitute suppliers who operate under economic incentives that reward adoption of cost-minimizing technologies, particularly when competitors such as salmon aquaculture are structured to operate year-round. Adoption of harvest and management strategies that fostered a race-for-fish led to unsustainable investment in processing capacity and infrastructure in remote communities; there was a competitive advantage to being close to harvesting grounds. Contraction of revenues has resulted in closure of processing facilities in communities with small or highly variable runs, or runs of low-value (pink and chum) salmon species, especially when those facilities are not located in transportation hubs. The loss of wage-income and tax receipts has compromised the economic viability of these communities. Even if the recent recovery in revenues ( Figure 1 ) persists, it is unlikely that processing capacity and related fisheries infrastructure will re-establish itself in remote communities. There have, however, been recent exceptions to 
Alaska's halibut fishery
Fisheries for Pacific halibut Hippoglossus stenolepsis also pre-date colonization. Nearshore fishing grounds were accessible to native Alaskans who employed longline fishing gear that closely resembles the gear in current use (Thompson and Freeman, 1930) . Although pre-modern peoples were highly effective seagoers and fishers, much of the halibut resource lies at depths and distances from the coast that were inaccessible to them. Exclusive rights to nearshore fishing grounds were well established and defended by local tribes (Newell, 1994) . Nevertheless, these rights were ignored by colonists, so starting in 1888, commercial fisheries for halibut developed off the US Pacific Northwest and British Columbia, then spread rapidly through southeast and southcentral Alaska and the Aleutian Islands. By the early 1900s, catch rates were in decline, and there was concern that the unregulated halibut fishery was biologically unsustainable (Thompson and Freeman, 1930) . Once again, a successful solution to the commonpool resource dilemma was disrupted by the advent of new resource claimants.
In 1923, the United States and Canada signed the Halibut Treaty. This stipulated formation of the International Pacific Halibut Commission and vested that Commission with authority to regulate halibut fishing along the eastern North Pacific coast. The Commission was charged to manage the fishery so as to maximize yields over time (IPHC, 1998) . Under catch limits established by the IPHC and enforced by the US and Canadian governments, the halibut stock was rebuilt, and catches increased through the 1950s ( Figure 3 ). Increased stock abundance and associated increased catch limits attracted more and more vessels, so to prevent overharvesting, the fishery managers set ever shorter seasons ( Figure 4) . However, the United States and Canada were powerless to control halibut catches in portions of the species' range outside their territorial seas [territorial seas extended 3 miles seawards before 1966; the United States extended its exclusive fishery zone to 12 miles from 4 October 1966 (P.L. 89-658), then in 1976, asserted regulatory authority over fishing out to 200 miles from the coast]. Surges in bycatch by foreign distantwater fleets caused a decline of the halibut stock and a reduction in the length of the domestic halibut season (Hoag and French, 1976) . Therefore, partial closure of the halibut commons in the 1920s led to the temporary re-establishment of biological sustainability, but a failure to control foreign harvest of halibut and to forestall the emergence of the race-for-fish caused instabilities in the socio-ecological system. Arrival of new resource claimants operating beyond the regulatory reach of the United States and Canada further disrupted the already precarious socio-ecological system, and tipped it towards biological as well as economic unsustainability ( Figure 3 ).
Stock declines attributable in part to the inability of coastal states to regulate harvests outside their territorial waters led to widespread declaration of 200-mile EEZs, and with those extended zones, the ability to control harvesting of fish stocks throughout larger portions of their natural ranges (Munro, 1982) . For halibut, the results were an effective constraint on total catches and supported rebuilding of the halibut stock (Figure 3) , i.e. the re-establishment of biological sustainability. However, the rebuilt stocks attracted more US and Canadian fishers and necessitated ever shorter seasons (Figure 4) , to the point that as much as 26 000 t was being landed in as little as 2 d. Between 1982 and 1993, the halibut fishery exceeded its catch limit by an annual average of 5.6%. Although "overages" were deducted from subsequent annual catch limits, failure to curb the race for shares of the allowable catch jeopardized the efficacy of the catch limits intended to ensure biological sustainability. Moreover, the heated race for fish reduced the quality of fish available to consumers, suppressed development of markets for fresh fish, prevented rationalization of capital investments, and decreased safety at sea (NRC, 1999) .
In 1991, Canada implemented a system of IVQs for the halibut fishery off British Columbia. IVQs allot fixed percentages of the annual IPHC-authorized halibut catch limit to the owners of vessels with an established history of participation in the British Columbia halibut fishery. Under the IVQ programme, fishers were freed from the race-for-fish and could time their catches to market opportunities and configure their investments in gear and quota shares to maximize their private economic returns (Casey et al., 1995) . Ex-vessel prices paid to Canadian fishers soared in the early 1990s (Herrmann, 1996 (Herrmann, , 2000 .
The North Pacific Fishery Management Council (NPFMC), a federal advisory body responsible for policy recommendations for fisheries outside state waters (0-3 miles) and within the 200-mile EEZ off Alaska, voted in 1991 to implement an IFQ programme for halibut and sablefish Anoplopoma fimbria off Alaska. After extensive public comment and review, the Alaska halibut and sablefish IFQ programme was implemented in 1995. The (1985) and IPHC (1991 IPHC ( -2011 .
The resilience of four Alaskan fisheries governed by durable entitlements IFQ programme awarded DEs to shares of the total allowable catch (TAC) of halibut and sablefish to the owners of vessels that had fished during a set of qualifying years; the share was based on their average catches during a subset of the qualifying years. The programme established separate quota-share allocations by region and vessel size class, allowed market-based transfer of quota shares between fishers, but prohibited transfers of quota shares between areas and vessel size classes. The programme also set limits on the consolidation of quota shares and restrictions on leasing (NRC, 1999) .
Under the IFQ programme, the halibut fishery off Alaska has re-organized to deliver high-quality fresh product throughout a protracted season. Average ex-vessel price (Alaska) increased US$ 0.53 kg -1 , about $11 million per year in ex-vessel revenue, with fishers receiving 92% and the processing sector 8% of this increase (Herrmann and Criddle, 2006) . Safety at sea has improved from an average of .27 search and rescue missions per season pre-IFQ to an average of ,8 missions per season post-IFQ. The fishery has consolidated; the number of permit-holders has declined by 34%, and the number of active fishing vessels has declined by almost 60% (NMFS, 2010) . Management of annual catch limits has become more precise, going from a pre-IFQ average "overage" of 5.6% to a post-IFQ average "underage" of 1.4%. Fishing mortality attributable to lost gear (ghost-fishing) has been reduced from an average of 3.2% to ,0.5% of the commercial catch.
In contrast to the loss of salmon LEPs from rural communities and based on the same definitions used to report changes in the distribution of salmon LEPs, rural Alaskan holdings of halibut IFQ have increased from 14.4% at initial issue in 1995 to 20.8% in 2009 20.8% in (NMFS, 2010 . Overall, 1.3% of the IFQ initially issued to Alaskans is now held by non-Alaskans (NMFS, 2010). In total, rural residents have increased their holdings of IFQ outside their region from 17.7to 21.8% and decreased their within-region holdings from 45.3 to 39.9%; this appears to be a result of consolidation within regions and diversification of regions fished to offset variability in within-region annual catch limits. Because the data are confidential, detailed analyses of these patterns of redistribution are unavailable. However, evidence suggests that rural IFQ holdings have increased in larger (population 1000-2500) rural communities (NMFS, 2010) . Processors that handled the bulk of halibut landings before implementation of IFQ lost market share and revenues as fishers bypassed traditional supply chains and entered into delivery contracts with custom-processors and wholesalers (Matulich and Clark, 2003) .
Under the IVQ and IFQ programmes, halibut fisheries became more sustainable from the perspectives of biological conservation and the economic viability of quota-share owners. These DEs fostered the emergence of new high-value fresh markets that benefited consumers. However, IFQ reduced the market power of processors and reduced the amount of fishing and fish-processing activities conducted in remote ports. Pinkerton and Edwards (2009) argue that leasing permitted under the Canadian IVQ programme has led to socially detrimental impacts. Carothers (2008) asserts that the sustainability of some remote communities was harmed when IFQ recipients cashed their quota shares or moved out of the community; private decision-making by IFQ-holders does not take full account of secondary social and economic impacts in the communities. Therefore, the introduction of DEs in the halibut fishery enhanced socio-ecological sustainability in larger rural Alaskan communities, but may have contributed to a decline of socio-ecological sustainability in some smaller and more remote communities.
Recent increases in the number of halibut harvested by sportfishing charters have reduced the quantity of fish available to the commercial fishery (NMFS, 2011) . The sportfishery went from 6.6% of total removals in 1990 to 11.7% in 2011 (Hare, 2011) . Because the asset value of IFQ depends on expectations of the value of current and future catches, decreases in catch limits in the commercial fishery, whether occasioned by reductions in stock abundance or increases in the quantity of halibut allocated to other user groups, reduces the asset value of the IFQ unless ex-vessel prices increase sufficiently to offset the reduction in allowable catch. In addition, increased catch by the charter sector has affected the ability of managers to control total catches of halibut because, unlike the commercial fishery, there is no realtime accounting for sport-catches. Instead, managers rely on estimates derived from an end-of-season mail survey to determine whether charter-based sport-catches have exceeded the Guideline Harvest Limit (GHL). If so, future sport-catches are subject to more-restrictive daily bag limits and rules on retention of large halibut. Despite these measures, the charter-based sport fishery has regularly exceeded the GHL. Therefore, unconstrained expansion of a new class of claimants once again threatens social, economic, and biological sustainability of the halibut fishery.
Criddle (2004) presents an illustrative example of the calculations required to derive a socially optimal allocation of halibut between commercial and sportfisheries. The problem requires a simultaneous selection of a level of sustainable yield and an allocation of that sustainable yield between sport-and commercial fisheries. However, because the overall optimal solution is suboptimal from the myopic perspective of each user group, it is in the selfinterest of stakeholders to oppose the socially optimal allocation, and if political processes are used to effect the allocation, not only is it unlikely that the outcome will be socially optimal, but there will also be substantial losses of political and financial resources used in lobbying decision-makers. Non-stationarities such as changes in output prices, changes in input prices, and changes in recreation participation rates change the socially optimal allocation. Consequently, because prices and participation rates are constantly changing, top-down management is unlikely to keep pace even if it is unfettered by political machinations.
The Alaska halibut and sablefish IFQ programme was designed to foster an owner-operator fishery, with overall limits on consolidation, owner-on-board requirements, and general prohibitions on quota-leasing. Concern at what the IFQ was doing to small (population ,2500) rural communities led the NPFMC, in 2002, to amend the halibut and sablefish IFQ programme to allow small rural communities bordering the Gulf of Alaska (GOA) to form non-profit CQ entities to purchase IFQ (NPFMC, 2004a) . The CQ entities were exempted from owner-on-board requirements and were allowed to lease quota to fishers. Although several communities formed non-profit entities to purchase CQ, Old Harbor on Kodiak Island is the only community that has purchased CQ, and the Old Harbor CQ entity has made only one purchase of IFQ. In contrast, CDQs for halibut and sablefish were issued without cost to six non-profit entities representing small rural communities bordering the Bering Sea. The CDQ entities were issued IFQs for 10% of the allowable catch of halibut in the southeastern Bering Sea, and 100% of the allowable catch of halibut in northern portions of the US portion of the Bering Sea (NMFS, 2007 Before 1995, the management paradigm put biological sustainability at risk and incentivized unsustainable investment in harvesting capacity. Adoption of the IFQ programme improved biological and economic sustainability in the commercial sector, but it ignored impacts to traditional processors and the secondary social and economic impacts to communities. Halibut IFQ holdings have increased in rural Alaska, but the increase has been in larger (population 1000-2500) communities. The CQ programme was devised to allow communities to purchase IFQ as a means of ensuring ongoing participation in the halibut fishery, but the CQ programme has not been successful because community investment in IFQ has not been attractive financially. In contrast, the CDQ programme received a de gratis allocation of halibut IFQ and has leveraged earnings from that initial endowment to support purchase of additional IFQ. The CDQ programme increased the social and economic sustainability of western Alaska communities. The CQ programme has a negligible effect on the social and economic sustainability of GOA coastal communities. Expansion of the charter sector has been accommodated through uncompensated reductions in commercial catch limits. The combination of expanded charter-sector catches and a cyclic downturn in halibut biomass amount to a shock that has pushed portions of the commercial sector in Southeast Alaska close to critical financial thresholds, threatening a loss of economic sustainability. Enforcing harvest limits set for the charter sector would protect the commercial fishery, as would a mechanism that would facilitate market-based transfers of IFQ between the commercial and charter sectors (Criddle, 2008) .
Pollock in the eastern Bering Sea and Aleutian Islands
The eastern Bering Sea and Aleutian Islands (BSAI) fishery for pollock Theragra chalcogramma is among the largest commercial fisheries in the world, with average annual catches more than 1 × 10 6 t (Ianelli et al., 2011) . With few exceptions, this species was not accessible to pre-modern fishers and was only lightly utilized in the first half of the 20th century. The fishery began in earnest the early 1960s, with harvests by distant-waters fleets from Japan and Russia (Alverson et al., 1964; Natural Resources Consultants, 1981) . Catches peaked in the early 1970s as biologically sustainable limits were exceeded ( Figure 5 ). With the passage of the Fishery Conservation and Management Act of 1976, the United States asserted exclusive rights to regulate fishing within a 200-mile littoral zone (NMFS, 2002) . Foreign fishing was permitted as long as catch limits exceeded projected domestic harvesting capacity, and catch limits were set to ensure biological sustainability. These limits were monitored by observers placed on board under the authority of the National Marine Fisheries Service. With effective capacity to control catches and a mandate under the Fishery Conservation and Management Act to set sustainable catch limits, the pollock stock was rebuilt.
By 1985, foreign fishing had been displaced by joint ventures between domestic catcher vessels and foreign processing vessels and shore plants (Berger et al., 1986) . By 1990, joint ventures had, in turn, been displaced in favour of domestic catcher vessels delivering to domestic processing plants and motherships, and US-flagged catcher-processors (NPFMC, 1991) . The authority to place observers on board pollock fishing vessels was extended to joint ventures and domestic catcher vessels and catcherprocessors, thereby ensuring accurate monitoring of catches and enabling in-season managers to shut the fishery before catch limits were exceeded. This gave managers the opportunity to ensure that catches did not exceed best estimates of biologically sustainable limits.
However, by 1991, continued influxes of fishing vessels, catcher-processors, and the expansion of shore-based processing capacity precipitated a derby on the fishing grounds and lobbying contests between inshore and at-sea sectors (NPFMC, 1991) . Excess capacity led to shortened fishing seasons, wasteful discards of fish carcasses during the roe season, and financial instability for the owners of fishing vessels and processing plants who were unable to operate at the levels of capacity needed to pay off loans (NPFMC, 1998) . Frequent bankruptcies demonstrated that the fishery was not economically sustainable (Hornnes, 2006; Strong, 2011) ; the pollock fishery was clearly not structured for economic sustainability.
In addition to racing for catch on the fishing grounds, the inshore and at-sea sectors jockeyed for political advantage in the NPFMC, each seeking opportunity to expand at the expense of the other. This sector allocation war pitted a mostly Japanese-owned shore-based processing sector against a largely Norwegian-financed catcher-processor sector, both of which based their fleets out of the Puget Sound region. As initial claimants of the pollock resource, the Japanese firms saw their erstwhile unfettered access to the BSAI pollock resource become ever more constrained, first by the 200-mile EEZ, next by the preference being given to joint-venture processing, then by preference being given to US domestic production. Their response was to invest in motherships and shore-based processors to take deliveries from the joint-venture catcher vessels and to structure their ownership through holding companies, subsidiaries, and non-voting stock shares to conform to statutory definitions of domestic companies. As a fully US-owned corporation, Trident Seafoods was a lone exception in the otherwise foreign-controlled pollock shorebased processing sector. The at-sea sector included the Japanese-controlled motherships and supporting catcher-boats, and a fleet of vessels, catcher-processors that processed their own catch as well as catches delivered by catcher boats. Catcher-processors began to enter the pollock fishery in the midst of the joint-venture era. Although a few were built from keel up in US shipyards, most were surplus US-flagged vessels that were extensively rebuilt in foreign, particularly Norwegian, shipyards and largely financed at favourable rates by Norwegian The resilience of four Alaskan fisheries governed by durable entitlements banks. With more fishing capacity than there were fish to catch, and more processing capacity than there were fish to process, each sector was anathema to the other.
Although the at-sea sector enjoyed operational advantages (Herrick et al., 1994) , the inshore sector was more effective at lobbying, so the sequence of sector allocations enacted between 1991 and 1998 led to less and less fish being allocated to the at-sea sector. This gave some freeboard to the inshore sector, but harvesting and processing capacity within that sector increased more rapidly than the inshore allocation, such that even if the at-sea sector could be forced out, the inshore sector would not be able to avoid the inexorable pathologies of a continued race-for-fish. Faced with the prospect of mutually assured financial ruin, representatives of the inshore and at-sea sectors bypassed the NPFMC and secured congressional legislation to establish permanent sector allocations and to facilitate economic rationalization within each sector (Criddle and Macinko, 2000) . The American Fisheries Act of 1998 (AFA) established a permanent moratorium on the entry of new vessels into the fishery and established a permanent allocation of the TAC to each sector. In addition, the AFA authorized payments of up to US$ 90 × 10 6 to retire 9 of the 29 catcher-processors that were then active in the fishery (AFA, 1998) . Catch history from the retired catcherprocessors was to be allocated to catcher vessels associated with the inshore sector in exchange for payment of US$ 75 million to the US Treasury at a rate of US$ 0.06 per pound landed. The AFA provided clear authority for companies within each sector to form cooperatives (AFA cooperatives) and to negotiate civil contracts to divide the sector allocation among cooperative members, i.e. the authority to contract with each other to create civilly enforced DEs. Provisions in the AFA also allowed marketbased within-sector transfers of DEs. The AFA increased the number of fisheries observers on board vessels and in processing plants, to ensure accurate accounting of catches of target species and bycatches of non-target species. In addition, the AFA made the Alaska CDQ programme permanent and increased the CDQ pollock allocation to 10% (AFA, 1998) .
The AFA resulted in a 50% increase in product recoveries per kilogramme of pollock caught, increases in the production of fillets instead of surimi, increased profits, reduced bycatch, and improved management precision (GAO, 1999 (GAO, , 2000 Felthoven, 2002; NPFMC, 2002; Morrison Paul et al., 2009) . In addition, the operational flexibility and increased profits afforded by the AFA helped the fishery weather changes in fishing seasons and areas required to address ecological concerns related to putative trophic interactions with the endangered western subpopulation of the Steller sea lion Eumetopias jubatus, helped the fishery accommodate heightened restrictions on bycatches of Chinook and chum salmon, and provided financial resources needed to modernize vessels and processing equipment (GAO, 2000; NPFMC, 2002; Criddle et al., 2011; Strong, 2011) . In other words, the AFA improved the economic sustainability of the pollock fishery, strengthened monitoring and compliance to better ensure biological sustainability of pollock harvests, and positioned the fishery better to accommodate policies intended to address some concerns related to sustainability of the BSAI ecosystems.
Unlike the salmon and halibut fisheries with their ties to coastal communities throughout Alaska, the pollock fishery primarily involved vessels based in the Pacific Northwest or in Alaskan ports served by pollock processors (NPFMC, 2002; Sepez et al., 2005) . Shore-based processing of BSAI pollock takes place primarily in Dutch Harbor/Unalaska, Akutan, Sand Point, and to a minor degree in Adak. Some catcher vessels that participate in the BSAI pollock fishery are based out of Kodiak, but Kodiak is too remote from the BSAI pollock fishing grounds so Kodiak pollock processors depend instead on the comparatively small ( 8 × 10 4 t) GOA pollock fishery. Value-added processing takes place at some of these plants, but also at reprocessing facilities in the Puget Sound region of Washington. Motherships and catcherprocessors often transfer processed pollock during visits to Dutch Harbor/Unalaska or on return to their Pacific Northwest homeports (Strong, 2011) . Plant managers and skilled workers in the shore-based plants are typically year-round residents of the communities; unskilled labour consists mostly of foreign nationals who reside in company dormitories and dine at company cafeterias. Fishing crew and skilled processing crew aboard catcher vessels and catcher-processors are mainly from the Pacific Northwest, but increasingly from western Alaska CDQ communities (WACDA, 2011) . Unskilled processing crew aboard motherships and catcherprocessors are mostly foreign nationals. Dutch Harbor/Unalaska is a regional hub for vessel repair and support services, but major overhauls and repairs are generally completed at larger ports, particularly in the Puget Sound region of Washington. As the AFA linked pollock landings to existing shore-based processing facilities, there has been little reshuffling of where pollock are delivered and little evidence of the types of community impact described in the salmon and halibut fisheries above. The one notable exception is that the Coastal Villages Region Fund, one of the CDQ entities, has expressed a desire to relocate the home base of its catcher-processor, the "Northern Hawk", from Seattle to Seward, AK (CVRF, 2011) .
The western Alaska CDQ programme is a unique initiative designed to ensure that remote western Alaskan coastal communities are direct beneficiaries of offshore commercial fisheries in the BSAI regions (Ginter, 1995; NRC, 1998) . Starting in 1992, the CDQ programme allocated 7.5% of the BSAI pollock TAC to six non-profit entities representing 56 (now 65) economically disadvantaged coastal communities in western Alaska (NPFMC, 1991) . CDQ rights were extended to include allocations of 10% or more of the annual BSAI TAC for pollock in 2006 and to include 10% to the TAC for other BSAI groundfish species, sablefish, halibut, king and Tanner crab, as well as the Prohibited Species Catch limits under the Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation Act of 2006 (NMFS, 2007) . CDQ entities earn royalties from leasing quota to community members or to fishing companies outside their regions and from investment earnings based on those royalties (Figure 6 ). In general, the CDQ for nearshore species is fished by local boats and for offshore species is leased to large vessels from outside the region (WACDA, 2011). CDQ entities are heavily invested in companies that operate large offshore catcher vessels, catcher-processors, motherships active in BSAI pollock and other groundfish fisheries, and shorebased processors (WACDA, 2011) . The mutually advantageous financial ties between the CDQ entities and AFA cooperatives contribute to social sustainability. For example, when the AFA fleet came under criticism over elevated bycatches of Chinook salmon, representatives from CDQ communities offered public testimony in support of regulatory measures preferred by their commercial partners (CVRF, 2011) .
Despite the many factors that contribute to the resilience of the pollock socio-ecological system, any of several external forcing 1174 K. R. Criddle factors could be disruptive. For example, increases in pollock catches from Russia or increases in landings or farmed production of other whitefish species could reduce demand in the markets for Alaska pollock and hence reduce ex-vessel revenues (Strong, 2011) . Similarly, continued reductions in Japanese demand for pollock roe could reduce one of the most profitable products and thereby threaten financial viability of the US fishery (Strong, 2011) . Natural variation in the geographic distribution of pollock as well as the need to avoid salmon bycatch can lead the fleet to fish at great distances from port, distances at which fishing may not be profitable for inshore catcher vessels that must deliver their catches to processors within 48 h or risk substantial deterioration in product quality (NMFS, 2002) . For example, in autumn 2007, a combination of long distance to productive fishing grounds, high fuel cost, low product price, and low catch rate led shore-based catcher boats to fail to harvest 10% (37 991 t) of their autumn pollock allocation (NMFS, 2012) . Strong (2011) demonstrates that whenever the fuel price rises more rapidly than the product price, the inshore sector is likely to forego harvesting portions of its autumn pollock allocation. In addition to being a direct loss to the inshore sector, the foregone harvests represent a potential loss of revenue to the CDQ entities owing to their ownership stakes in inshore catcher vessels. It also represents a loss of net benefits to the nation as a whole as well as a lost opportunity to the at-sea sector which could harvest the pollock profitably that the inshore vessels are unable to harvest profitably. Because the AFA was devised by Congress, it can only be amended by congressional action. Such action is unlikely, because it risks reopening other provisions of the AFA that could prove disadvantageous to current participants in the fishery. Therefore, the BSAI region pollock socio-ecological system is resilient to moderate perturbations in external forcing factors, but strictures on the transfer of DEs between the inshore and at-sea sectors create conditions that predispose the system to fail when perturbed beyond critical economic thresholdsthresholds that were crossed in autumn of 2007 (NMFS, 2012 and are likely to be crossed again in the future.
Crab in the eastern Bering Sea and Aleutian Islands
Crab and other crustaceans were important to native fishers in the pre-modern era and continue to be important for subsistence, sport, and commercial fisheries. The history of Alaska region crustacean fishery management is particularly troublesome. Northern pink shrimp Pandalus eous fisheries flourished in the 1960s and 1970s but crashed and have only supported small catches in subsequent decades. Red king crab Paralithodes camtschaticus in the GOA supported a substantial fishery in the 1960s but declined in the 1970s, crashed in the 1980s, and has not recovered. To a greater or lesser degree, all commercially harvested BSAI region stocks of red king crab, blue king crab Paralithodes platypus, snow crab Chionoecetes opilio, and Tanner crab Chionoecetes bairdi have shown similar patterns of boom and bust (Figure 7 ). For the past two decades, four of the six largest crab fisheries off Alaska have supported levels of fishing mortality that are ,3% of their 50-year peak. In the other two, recent (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) (2008) (2009) (2010) fishing mortality is ,15% of the 50-year peaks. This suggests strongly that limits to the biophysical sustainability for these species are not yet fully understood.
Whereas the NPFMC has overall authority for the management of crab in the 200-mile EEZ, in-season management of the fisheries has been delegated to the Alaska Department of Fish and Game (ADF&G). For many years, the ADF&G sought to control catch and stabilize crab populations through a combination of minimum size limits, prohibitions on the retention of female crab, and season-length regulations. The NPFMC contributed to management objectives by restricting the bycatch of crab in groundfish fisheries. In each of the regulated crustacean fisheries, The resilience of four Alaskan fisheries governed by durable entitlements an absence of effective limits to the number of fishing vessels led to compressed seasons (NPFMC, 2004b) . Because crab must be processed live, processors had to increase their throughput capacity as the number of crab fishing vessels increased, capacity idled as soon as the crab seasons closed (Matulich, 2009) . Hazardous weather conditions combined with the race-for-crab led to high rates of injury and loss of life (NPFMC, 2004b) .
ADF&G managers attempted to reduce the intensity of the crab derby through limits on the number of pots (baited traps) per vessel for some fisheries, and through super-exclusive registration for participation in fisheries for some minor crab stocks. Pot limits were economically disadvantageous to the largest boats; they led those boats to place and retrieve their gear at a faster rate than was economically efficient (Greenberg and Herrmann, 1994) . Vessels that participated in super-exclusive registration fisheries were prohibited from fishing in any other crab fishery. Because super-exclusive registrations were implemented in small fisheries such as the Norton Sound fishery for red king crab, the cost of being ineligible to participate in larger fisheries caused big boats to refrain from entering super-exclusive fisheries, reducing the competition for local small-boat fishers (Natcher et al., 1996) . Pot limits did not improve the economic sustainability of crab fisheries and had no beneficial effect on biological sustainability (Greenberg and Herrmann, 1994) . In contrast, super-exclusive registration provided some improvement in the economic and social sustainability of small local fisheries, because it had the effect of reducing the number of participants in the fishery and hence reducing the intensity of the race-for-crab (Natcher et al., 1996) .
Starting with the 2005/2006 fishing season, management of the BSAI crab fisheries was restructured with IFQ issued to vessel owners and skippers and individual processing quota (IPQ) issued to shore-based and floating processors (NPFMC, 2004b) . Allocation of IFQ and IPQ was based on catch history and processing history. Under the programme, fishers can only sell their catch to processors with sufficient IPQ and processors can only purchase crab from vessels possessing IFQ. In addition, the programme includes financial impediments to discourage harvesters from switching to processors other than those to whom they have sold catches previously. The programme also includes provisions to arbitrate ex-vessel prices. In addition, the crab IFQ/IPQ programme allocated 10% of crab IFQ to Alaska CDQ entities.
The implementation of the programme led to substantial increases in revenues to harvesters (Matulich, 2008) , whereas processors did not gain significant benefits (Matulich, 2009) . Following programme implementation, the number of vessels actively fishing for crab declined to 34% of the number previously; consolidation has been more pronounced outside of Alaska (32.8%) than in Alaska (37.9%). Since programme implementation, the distribution of home ports for crab vessels has increased from 24.2% Alaskan to 27% Alaskan. The fraction of crab vessels home-ported in Washington has declined (65.4-61.5%), whereas the fraction in Oregon has increased (8.8-10.3%). The number of vessels home-ported in other states has declined from four to one. The number of crew jobs decreased to a similar extent. The reduction in part-time employment opportunities resulted in substantial numbers of past crew members becoming dissatisfied with programme outcomes (Lazrus et al., 2011) . However, Abbot et al. (2010) report that total man-hours of crew labour was unchanged by programme implementation, that total wages paid to crew also remained unchanged, and that fewer crew were employed so the annual earnings for active crew increased. As most hiring is done where the vessel and skipper are based, the distribution of employment impacts appears to mirror the distribution of changes in the home ports of active vessels (Lazrus et al., 2011) . Like the halibut/sablefish IFQ programme and the pollock AFA cooperatives, the crab IFQ/IPQ programme increased economic benefits for quota shareholders. Ownership of IFQ has consolidated, the pace of fishing has slowed, vessels that continue to be used in the fishery are used for longer seasons, and pots are soaked for longer periods between retrievals (Abbot et al., 2010). Longer seasons are advantageous to owners, skippers, and crew who specialize in crab fisheries, but disadvantageous to those who engaged historically in a suite of crab and other fisheries.
By defining crab DEs as rights to catch/sell and rights to buy, the crab IFQ/IPQ programme provided a measure of stability to processors and their adjoining communities, but when a processor closes for financial or other reasons, fishers may be bereft of a market for their IFQ crab. This is most likely to arise in remote regions with relatively small fisheries and a single local processor, for example, in the Pribilof Islands and on Adak. In each case, the National Marine Fisheries Service has issued emergency orders to provide fishers with markets for their IFQ crab, but the need for ad hoc measures suggests that the IPQ/IFQ crab fishery socioecological system is less resilient in peripheral fisheries such as Adak and the Pribilof Islands. As noted above, consolidation of IFQ has reduced the number of crew positions and increased the duration of crew jobs to something that more closely matches the duration of crew jobs in the 1970s before vessels flooded into the fishery and precipitated the race-for-crab (Abbot et al., 2010) . These changes are beneficial for some crew and detrimental for others. The impact of the changes on communities is unclear. Are the communities better off with smaller numbers of fully employed crew or larger numbers of crew employed for short seasons? The volatile character of crab populations raises questions about whether the consolidated fishery can expand effort to match rapid increases in crab stocks. Consider, for example, the Bering Sea fishery for snow crab (Figure 7 ), which experienced a fourfold increase in allowed catch between 1996 and 1998. Fisheries with excess harvesting capacity or latent permits can quickly respond to increases in allowable harvest limits. However, it is uncertain if a fleet consolidated for optimal economic efficiency for a snow crab catch limit 0.3 × 10 5 t can reconfigure quickly to harvest a catch 1.2 × 10 5 t. To increase harvesting capacity, it could be necessary for current IFQ-holders to sell or lease IFQ to vessels that are not currently active in the fishery. A similar potential need to expand processing capacity was addressed in the design of IPQ by allowing for an influx of processors if certain landings thresholds are exceeded.
Discussion
Sustainable fisheries-dependent socio-ecological systems are founded on practices that ensure that the expected flow of use, option, and non-use benefits do not degrade through time. However, choices of which combination of benefits to sustain and choices of management measures to promote those benefits imply choices about who will benefit. The four cases discussed above demonstrate that DE programmes are not a panacea. As suggested in Johnson and Libecap (1982) and demonstrated 1176 K. R. Criddle theoretically in Boyce (1992) , DE programmes can contribute to biological sustainability but cannot ensure it. NRC (1999) suggested that the primary conservation benefits of DE programmes would be reductions in bycatch discard mortality and ghost fishing, and closer adherence to the TAC. Recent empirical studies (e.g. Branch, 2009; Essington, 2010) suggest that the primary conservation benefits have resulted from establishment and enforcement of biologically sustainable TACs. The implementation of DE programmes disrupts extant social systems to the benefit of some individuals and communities to the detriment of others. Whether the result of these changes is increased or decreased, sustainability is unclear. DE programmes are generally adopted as measures of last resort for fisheries that have ceased to be socially or economically sustainable. Consequently, the status quo ex ante is unlikely to be sustainable. Nevertheless, DE programmes often include measures to force the outcome to preserve social and economic characteristics of the status quo ex ante. However, such measures may prevent the system from adapting to changes in stock abundance and spatial distribution, changes in ex-vessel prices and input costs, etc. Fisheries-dependent socioecological systems are inherently non-stationary. Because the behaviour of non-stationary systems is inherently different from that of stationary systems, management strategies designed for stationary systems are unlikely to be successful. Reducing the number of restrictions imposed on DE programmes will increase their ability to evolve when faced with non-stationarities or shocks.
DE programmes that fail to include all major groups of fishers, as in failure to include charter-operators in the Alaska halibut IFQ programme, are unlikely to be socially sustainable in the face of increased demands by the omitted category of users. For Alaska halibut, expansion of the charter sector led to increased conflict with the commercial sector and to a suite of regulatory proposals intended to limit further expansion of the charter sector or to devise market mechanisms for balancing allocations between commercial IFQ-holders and charter operators. That expansion of the charter sector coincided with an environmentally induced reduction in halibut growth rates and exacerbated the conflict between commercial IFQ-holders and charter operators. Although DE programmes increase choice and therefore resilience from the perspective of individuals, their effect on the resilience of fishery-dependent communities is ambivalent. If DEs are allocated to individuals and are freely transferable, decisions to accumulate or divest DEs are unlikely to attend to social impacts. However, DEs do not have to be defined as the possessions of individuals; they can be defined for sectors as they were for AFA pollock cooperatives or for communities as they were for the CDQ programmes. Allocating DEs to sectors or communities might facilitate consideration of a broad set of social impacts, but it may not actually lead to broadened consideration of social impacts.
